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BOOK REVIEW
THE PROMISE AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS
Tom Liningert
CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES: How LAW ENFORCEMENT USES (AND
MISUSES) LANGUAGE. By Roger W Shuy. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005. Pp. 185. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION
When many people think of expert testimony in the criminal jus-
tice system, they imagine testimony involving the forensic techniques
employed by the fictional investigators on the television show CSI:
Crime Scene Investigation.I In a high-profile case, jurors expect to hear
about DNA testing, ballistics analysis, fingerprint matching, handwrit-
ing comparisons, and autopsies.2 Indeed, jurors have developed a
near reverence for such expert testimony in criminal trials.3
Professor Roger Shuy would add a new category of forensic ex-
pertise to the pantheon: linguistics. In his latest book, Creating Lan-
guage Crimes: How Law Enforcement Uses (and Misuses) Language,
Professor Shuy points out that police, either by themselves or through
their cooperating witnesses, have been known to manipulate language
t Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. The author thanks John
Althouse Cohen and Micaela McMurrough for their excellent editing.
I See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 925 (2006) ("Many citizens' sense of the criminal justice system comes
from movies or television shows that build open-and-shut cases on forensic evidence and
end with swift jury trials."); Jamie Stockwell, Defense, Prosecution Play to New 'CSI' Savvy,
WASH. PosT, May 22, 2005, at Al ("Prosecutors say jurors are telling them they expect
forensic evidence in criminal cases, just like on their favorite television shows, including
'CSI: Crime Scene Investigation.'").
2 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and
Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1053 (2006) (citingjurors' complaints over a
lack of DNA, fingerprint, and gunshot residue evidence in Robert Blake's criminal trial);
Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 739,
783 n.304 ("Prosecutors worry that the 'CSI effect' places a heightened burden on them to
produce forensic evidence.").
3 See Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction, YALE L.J. POCKET PART (2006),
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/02/thomas.html (reporting that in a survey of 102 Mari-
copa County prosecutors "38% believed they had at least one trial that resulted in either an
acquittal or hung jury because forensic evidence was not available," even though the re-
spondents felt that the other evidence in the record was sufficient to support a conviction).
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in their undercover investigations. 4 The solution, according to Profes-
sor Shuy, is for defense attorneys to offer expert testimony by forensic
linguists who can expose the misuse and misinterpretation of lan-
guage by undercover agents. 5 With the aid of an expert linguist, the
defense can show that the recorded language does not necessarily
evince the defendant's guilt.6
Professor Shuy, himself an expert in linguistics, 7 deserves praise
for drawing attention to the conversational strategies through which
law enforcement officers create the appearance of a suspect's guilt.
But Professor Shuy places too much faith in the ability of expert testi-
mony to solve this problem. Experts can obfuscate as well as eluci-
date. In many cases, lay jurors are in the best position to discern the
meaning of language, and reliance on experts to infer the defendant's
intent in such cases would usurp the jury's fact-finding role. In any
event, the increased importance of forensic experts would further
skew the criminal justice system in favor of wealthy defendants who
can afford to retain such experts, and would decrease the odds of ac-
quittal for indigent defendants. 8
This Book Review will proceed in three steps. First, I will ex-
amine the evidence and arguments that Professor Shuy presents, and I
will suggest that his insights have made an important contribution to
our understanding of undercover operations. Second, I will respect-
4 See generally ROGER W. SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES: How LAw ENFORCEMENT
USES (AND MISUSES) LANGUAGE passim (2005). Professor Shuy does not claim that this lan-
guage manipulation occurs all the time, but rather that it is unfair when it does occur. He
writes:
I make no claim that all, or even many, undercover operations carried out
by law enforcement agencies regularly engage in the practice of creating
false illusions about their targets' guilt. However, in the quarter century
that I have been analyzing tape-recorded sting operations and police inter-
rogations, I have seen an ample number of instances that qualify as the
kind of linguistic unfairness that can land people in prison when they only
thought they had said something noninculpatory and benign.
Id. at x.
5 See id. at 173-77.
6 See id. at 184.
7 Professor Shuy is Emeritus Distinguished Research Professor of Linguistics at Ge-
orgetown University. He is not a lawyer. He has a Ph.D. in English and linguistics. He has
written five books on linguistics and the law. SHIY, supra note 4; ROGER W. SHUY, THE
LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION, INTERROGATION AND DECEPTION (1998); ROGER W. SHUY, LAN-
GUAGE CRIMES (1993); ROGER W. SHIy, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES (2002);
ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTICS IN THE COURTROOM: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2006); accord Curric-
ulum Vitae of Roger W. Shuy, Ph.D., http://www.rogershuy.com/pdf/RWS_curriculum_
vitae.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
8 See Uphoff, supra note 2, at 782 ("[A]ccess to critical expert assistance is very une-
ven and largely illusory .... "); ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFEND-
ANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JuSTICE 10-11
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/broken-
promise/fullreport.pdf (discussing disparities in the availability of experts and resulting
unfairness).
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fully disagree with Professor Shuy about the value of testimony by ex-
pert linguists in many categories of criminal cases. Third, I will
propose other means through which the criminal justice system can
avoid wrongful convictions based on manipulative conversational
strategies used by police.
While my arguments will occasionally clash with Professor Shuy's,
the overall tone of this Book Review is adulatory. Professor Shuy
richly deserves his reputation as America's top forensic linguist. That
his latest book provokes discussion-and respectful disagreement-is
but a testament to his scholarly stature.
I
PROFESSOR SHUY'S EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT
A brief comment about Roger Shuy's credentials should preface
any review of his scholarship. Professor Shuy is to linguistics what
Barry Scheck is to DNA evidence. 9 The analogy is fitting not only be-
cause of these two experts' unparalleled experience (Professor Shuy
has testified in approximately five hundred criminal cases), but also
because of their shared inclination to assist the defense (Professor
Shuy has never testified for the government, and he has consulted for
the government in only eleven of his five hundred cases).1
Professor Shuy's central concern is the "way undercover opera-
tives in a sting case can bend and twist conversations to suit the goals
of an eventual prosecution."" t He focuses on investigations of fraud,
bribery, solicitation, threats to witnesses, and other crimes committed
through the utterance of words. 12 These crimes are, in effect, "lan-
guage crimes." 13
Professor Shuy offers a taxonomy of the conversational strategies
through which police "create" language crimes in recorded conversa-
tions. 14 First, an undercover agent or informant might propose a
criminal enterprise in a deliberately ambiguous manner to obtain the
assent of a target, thus creating the appearance of a crime when the
9 Barry Scheck teaches as a clinical professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law and is widely regarded as a leading figure in the use of forensics in criminal defense.
He is perhaps best known for his roles as a co-founder of the Innocence Project and as a
member of OJ. Simpson's successful defense team. See Cardozo Full-Time Faculty, http://
www.cardozo.yu.edu/facultystaff/fulltimeQZ.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); The Inno-
cence Project: About Us, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). He
"is known for his landmark litigation setting standards for forensic applications of DNA
technology." Cardozo Full-Time Faculty, supra. Scheck has also "represented such notable
clients as Hedda Nussbaum .... Louise Woodward, and Abner Louima." Id.
10 SHuY, supra note 4, at 180.
11 Id. at5.
12 See id. at 6.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 13-29.
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target may in fact have lacked criminal intent. 15 Second, the agent or
informant might block the target's words, either by "[c] rearing static
on the tape," by "[i] nterrupting or overlapping the target's words," or
by "[s]peaking on behalf of the target."16 A third manipulative strat-
egy is to conceal important information so that the target does not
fully appreciate the significance of the matters under discussion.' 7
Fourth, the government's operative might simply refuse to acquiesce
when the target says "no."'18 Fifth, the undercover agent or informant
might restate the target's words in a misleading manner. 19 Finally, the
most blatant strategy entails "scripting" the conversation by telling the
target what to say-for example, by preparing the target for a meeting
with a third party.20
As a general matter, Professor Shuy is leery of the tape recorder.
It can be shut on or off at the whim of an undercover police officer-
or, worse still, an informant.2 1 A tape recorder picks up only those
conversations in close proximity to the microphone. Consequently,
the agent wearing the microphone may subtly manipulate the record-
ing by turning away from the target or otherwise impeding the de-
vice's ability to record the conversation accurately. 22 An audio
recording does not capture the nuances of gestures or facial expres-
sions.2 3 Moreover, even under the best of circumstances, audio re-
cording technology generally cannot accurately preserve all the words
in a conversation. 24
A substantial portion of Professor Shuy's book offers illustrations
from real-life cases in which informants secretly recorded the targets
15 See id. at 15-16 (noting that an agent might, for example, refer to a potential crime
only as "it" or "the thing").
16 Id. at 16-20.
17 See id. at 24-25.
18 See id. at 26.
19 See id. at 26-27.
20 Id. at 28-29.
21 See id. at 20-21 (noting that the use of conversations tape-recorded by informants is
especially problematic because many "[u]nscrupulous cooperating witnesses . . . have al-
ready been caught in a crime themselves").
22 See id. at 17 ("The persons wearing the hidden microphone have control and power
over what is being recorded. They can even move away from a conversation if it isn't going
the way they want it to go. Many mikes are sensitive to movement sounds and produce a
kind of static noise when the wearers move around. If they chose to move at a crucial
point, the resulting noise can successfully block on tape what the target is saying.").
23 Cf id. at 3 (noting that audio recordings omit "important clues about nonverbal
communication").
24 For example, a tape recording sometimes cannot accurately capture a conversation
in which two or more people speak simultaneously. See id. at 17. Professor Shuy notes that
such interruption and overlap occur universally in human conversations. See id.
836 [Vol. 92:833
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of sting operations.25 For example, he highlights a solicitation-of-mur-
der case in which the informant used the "hit and run" technique
while recording the defendant's allegedly inculpatory comments. 26
Through this technique, the informant captures a brief excerpt of re-
corded conversation that serves the government's purpose and then
quickly leaves before the target can clarify his meaning. 27 Professor
Shuy also focuses on a homicide investigation in which the informant
repeatedly retold the story of an alleged crime in terms that incul-
pated the target, hoping that the target might eventually assent to the
incriminating version. 28 Another chapter covers an investigation of
business fraud in which an informant recorded the target's reactions
to eleven fairly innocuous statements that, in the aggregate, created
an impression of fraudulent intent. 29 Additionally, Professor Shuy re-
counts how an informant in a bribery case selectively recorded por-
tions of his conversations with a target by purposefully creating
electronic static to create an inference of guilt.30
Professor Shuy's examples from real-life cases involve undercover
officers as well as informants. In an obstruction of justice investiga-
tion, an undercover officer camouflaged the criminal nature of his
proposition in order to induce the target's assent.3 1 Police employed
a similar tactic in a prosecution for purchasing stolen property: to
conceal the fact that goods were stolen, an undercover agent did not
explicitly discuss the source of the property or the manner in which it
had been obtained.3 2 Another case involved an undercover officer
who, while investigating a murder-for-hire, offered to kill the husband
of the target's daughter and repeatedly refused to take "no" for an
answer.33 In one particularly galling example, police interrogated a
mentally infirm murder suspect for five consecutive days but recorded
a cumulative total of only four hours' worth of audio tape.34 They also
used frequent interruptions, inaccurate restatements, and "scripting"
to create the impression that the target had confessed. 5
25 Each of Chapters 4-15 focuses on a specific case illustrating the use of conversa-
tional strategies to create the illusion that the defendant committed a language crime. See
id. at 41-164.
26 Id. at 44-49.
27 See id. at 44, 47, 49 ("After he put what he considered the allegedly incriminating
words on the tape, McCrory quickly ran away, saying 'I gotta go.'").
28 See id. at 51-57.
29 See id. at 69-80.
30 See id. at 89-98.
31 See id. at 109-16 (describing an investigation of alleged obstruction ofjustice by a
defense attorney who had assented when an undercover investigator used benign language
such as "retrieve" and "make copies" rather than stark descriptions of obstructive conduct).
32 See id. at 117-27.
33 See id. at 139, 153-57.
34 See id. at 159-64.
35 Id.
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Although Professor Shuy spends more time criticizing present law
enforcement practices than offering solutions, one notion pervading
his book is the salutary effect of expert testimony by linguists. Profes-
sor Shuy suggests that experts should review recordings carefully and
point out manipulative conversational strategies to the jury.36 Noting
that "[1]inguists are trained to identify such conversational strategies
and describe their overall significance to a given conversation," 37 Pro-
fessor Shuy believes that expert linguists can detect the purposeful use
of ambiguity, interruption, overlapping, and other "blocking" strate-
gies.38 In virtually every case he cites, linguists insightfully expose the
contrivances of undercover officers and informants.
More fundamentally, Professor Shuy suggests that as a general
matter, proactive undercover operations are often too aggressive. He
asserts that an ideal investigation would wait for the target to "self-
generate[ ]" evidence of his guilt.3 9 While admitting that "[i]t will
normally take longer this way," he concludes that "the evidence elic-
ited can be much stronger." 40 If the target is not forthcoming, the
undercover agent or informant should "drop hints of illegality, hop-
ing that the target[ ] will catch them and perhaps develop them fur-
ther."41 As a last resort, the government operative should simply
propose a crime in unambiguous terms so that any recording made of
the interaction will plainly reflect the target's acceptance or rejection
of the proposal. 42
There is a great deal of merit in Professor Shuy's analysis. The
dynamics of controlled transactions are subtle. When police strive too
zealously to capture guilt on tape, the recording takes on a life of its
own. Rather than manifesting the defendant's criminal intent, the
tape may simply reflect the officer's manipulation. Expert linguists
can counteract this phenomenon by offering alternate explanations
for defendants' statements or conduct. In this manner, the expert
linguist may right the balance of power between an unsuspecting tar-
get who chooses words carelessly and an undercover agent or inform-
ant who is, in effect, conducting a surreptitious deposition.
36 See id. at 173-77.
37 Id. at 175-76.
38 Id. at 174-76.
39 Id. at 9.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 8.
42 See id.
[Vol. 92:833838
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II
CRITICISM OF PROFESSOR SHUY'S BOOK
I commend Professor Shuy for advancing our understanding of
police tactics, but I think he overstates the benefit of involving linguis-
tic experts in criminal trials. When the prosecution presents a surrep-
titiously recorded conversation, the key legal question is typically
whether the language indicates that the defendant possessed the req-
uisite mens rea.43 Layjurors are often capable of making this determi-
nation without the aid of an expert linguist. Lay jurors have used
language all of their lives, allowing them to weigh the meaning of lan-
guage without the aid of experts. 44 When the lay understanding of
language diverges from the expert's understanding, the former car-
ries more weight because the dispositive issue remains the lay defen-
dant's understanding of the language at the time of its recording. 45
Indeed, if the language in question is so vague as to necessitate expert
analysis, that fact alone likely means the prosecution will have trouble
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not an expert
linguist assists the defense.
Furthermore, allowing (or even requiring) such expert testimony
might cause expert witnesses to usurp the jury's role in determining
the meaning of language used in a controlled transaction. When an
expert gives an opinion on a "conversational strategy," the expert in-
vites jurors to disengage their common sense and rely instead on the
expert's judgment.46 It is this very concern about the intrusion of ex-
perts into the province of the jury that led Congress to amend Federal
43 See James F. Ponsoldt & Stephen Marsh, Entrapment Mhen the Spoken Word Is the
Crime, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1200-01 (2000) (noting that a defendant charged with a
"spoken word" crime may be more likely than a typical defendant to raise a claim that he
lacked the requisite mens rea by arguing that he sounds corrupt in this particular tape
recording only because the prosecutor intentionally created that effect through his agent).
44 See Dana R. Hassin, How Much Is Too Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal Use vs.
Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 667, 669 (2001) (discussing the longstanding view
that "absent inability or incompetence ofjurors on the basis of their day-to-day experience
and observation to comprehend the issues and to evaluate the evidence," the admission of
expert testimony is "both unnecessary and improper"). Moreover, in contrast to their fa-
miliarity with language, lay jurors have not performed DNA testing, ballistics analysis, and
other forensic techniques all of their lives; therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence require
expert testimony on these matters. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (barring the admission of expert
testimony unless "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact").
45 The mens rea test inquires whether the defendant-generally a layperson rather
than a linguistics expert-subjectively intended to commit a crime. Justin D. Levinson,
Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural
Differences, 49 HOWARD L.J. 1, 4 (2005) ("[T]he mens rea inquiry looks at a specific actor's
subjective mental state at the time of the crime .... [J]urors are asked to determine what
the defendant was thinking at the time of the crime.").
46 SHUY, supra note 4, at 13.
2007] 839
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Rule of Evidence 704 so that experts could not opine on the mental
state of the accused. 4
7
Increased emphasis on expert linguists might also skew the crimi-
nal justice system further in favor of wealthy defendants who could
afford to pay the expert's fees. Indeed, to the extent that judges and
juries become accustomed to expert testimony on linguistics, the
criminal justice system might begin not only to favor parties who em-
ploy linguists but also to oppose those who do not. Defendants might
be able invoke a statutory or constitutional right to the assistance of
experts in some circumstances, but this argument is rarely availing
outside the context of death penalty cases. 48 We should be wary of
extending the "CSI effect"49 to linguistics: if jurors come to expect ex-
pert linguists, the absence of such linguists might appear to signal a
party's weakness.50
Ironically, while Professor Shuy criticizes police for selectively
presenting certain aspects of undercover conversations "to make their
targets look guilty,"'51 Professor Shuy himself marshals evidence selec-
tively. He offers illustrations that are horror stories rather than typical
experiences. He omits the mundane stories of straightforward, con-
trolled transactions in which targets plainly reveal their criminal in-
tent. 52  It is understandable that Professor Shuy leaves out such
stories-after all, he is not writing the textbook for Drug Investiga-
47 Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) states:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of
a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to
whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
Congress adopted this rule due to widespread public frustration with the use of expert
testimony to establish the insanity ofJohn HinckleyJr., who shot President Ronald Reagan
and Press Secretary James Brady. See Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules
of Evidence Advisoy Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 713-14
(2000). The premise of Rule 704(b) is that jurors who hear such expert testimony will
simply adopt the expert's conclusions rather than closely scrutinizing the underlying evi-
dence. See id.
48 See Michael J. Yaworksy, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in State Criminal Case
to Assistance of Psychiatrist or Psychologist, 85 A.L.R. 4th 19, § 12 (1991) (citing cases limiting
the right to assistance by a psychiatrist to capital cases). See generally FED. R. EvD. 706
(allowing courts to appoint expert witnesses for indigent parties and provide these experts
with reasonable compensation); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVI-
DENCE UNDER THE RULES 620 (5th ed. 2004) ("[C]ourts appoint experts only rarely, and
Rule 706 is one of the least-used provisions in the Federal Rules.").
49 See supra notes 1-2.
50 See Thomas, supra note 3.
51 SHUY, supra note 4, at xiii.
52 See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida & Brian Forst, Controlling Street-Level Drug Trafficking: Profes-
sional and Community Policing Approaches, in DRUGS AND CRIME: EVALUATING PUBLIC POLICY
INITtATivES 77, 83-84 (Doris Layton MacKenzie & Craig D. Uchida eds., 1994).
[Vol. 92:833
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tions 101-but the asymmetry of Professor Shuy's anecdotal evidence
may say more about his own experience than about the general prac-
tices of police.
Finally, I take issue with Professor Shuy's general distrust of
proactive investigative strategies. His preference for passive listening
by undercover officers5 3 is problematic. Officers who only listen to,
rather than participate in, criminal activity may not be able to win the
trust of the suspects under investigation. A passive investigative strat-
egy would be inefficient and would likely require a greater amount of
time to investigate each case, thereby reducing the number of investi-
gations officers have the time and resources to conduct. If officers
could not contrive circumstances that squarely present suspects with
opportunities to commit crimes, they would likely hear only oblique
references to criminal activity, and the evidence available to the prose-
cution would be much weaker. Indeed, why would a suspect reveal his
or her criminal scheme to one who is uninvolved in the scheme? Fur-
ther, the passive listening strategy may jeopardize the safety of officers:
without the ability to control the precise date and time of the transac-
tion under surveillance, police would be unable to intervene if some-
thing went wrong.54
In sum, while I do not challenge the validity of Professor Shuy's
general thesis, I believe that his proposed method of relying on expert
linguists and passive law enforcement techniques would not provide
an ideal means of achieving his laudable goal: the protection of inno-
cent defendants from conviction based on misleading conversational
strategies. Additional measures are necessary to regulate overzealous
undercover operations.
III
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
The best approach would blend Professor Shuy's suggestions with
other strategies that could check inappropriate police conduct. This
Book Review proposes four such reforms: (1) rejuvenation of entrap-
ment law, (2) expanded use of videotape surveillance, (3) stricter en-
forcement of Brady v. Maryland55 in investigations that utilize
surreptitious recording, and (4) fortification of defendants' right to
confront participants in recorded conversations.
53 See, e.g., SHuy, supra note 4, at 9 ("The best evidence [law enforcement officers] can
get is when the target self-generates his own guilt without prompting or influence.").
54 Professor Shuy himself recognizes that a strategy of passive listening by law enforce-
ment officers is not feasible in every case. See id. at 8.
55 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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To begin with, courts and legislatures should revitalize entrap-
ment law.56 The conduct of which Professor Shuy complains is, in
many cases, entrapment: government agents lure unwitting targets
into linguistic traps that enable the government to convict suspects
irrespective of their true mens rea. Indeed, the very title of Professor
Shuy's book-Creating... Crimes-implies entrapment.
A robust entrapment doctrine should be able to reach such con-
duct. Where the government has used improper inducements to in-
volve the defendant in criminal activity, the government should forfeit
its right to prosecute that defendant. 57 For example, a court should
not tolerate the prosecution of a target if the government has en-
gaged in outrageous conduct such as badgering the target despite per-
sistent rejections, "scripting" the target, or camouflaging a criminal
plan to make it more attractive.
Unfortunately, the current doctrine of entrapment is anything
but robust. The test for entrapment now focuses more on the predis-
position of the accused than the government's conduct in inducing
the criminal behavior at issue. 58 This emphasis on predisposition al-
lows the prosecution to overcome an entrapment defense by showing
that the defendant has a criminal history,59 even when the govern-
ment's inducement may be otherwise impermissible. An inducement-
focused theory of entrapment would rein in manipulation of language
and better protect suspects who have prior convictions. 60 Reconcep-
56 See United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a
defense of entrapment may exist where the government induced the criminal activity in
question and the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime without that
inducement).
57 SeeJacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (1992) ("Because the Government
overstepped the line between setting a trap for the unwary innocent and the unwary crimi-
nal, and as a matter of law failed to establish that petitioner was independently predisposed
to commit the crime for which he was arrested, we reverse the Court of Appeals'judgment
affirming his conviction." (quotations omitted)); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
372 (1958) ("The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crimes and the appre-
hension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of
crime.").
58 See Bennett L. Gershman, Comment, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrap-
ment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1567-71 (1982) (explaining the courts' preference for the subjec-
tive theory of entrapment, which focuses on the defendant's predisposition, over the
objective theory, which focuses on the nature of the government's inducement).
59 An entrapment defense gives the government wide latitude to introduce evidence
of a defendant's prior crimes, notwithstanding Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its
state counterparts. See United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006) (quot-
ing United States v. Horn, 277 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2002)) (holding that a defendant who
raises an entrapment defense foregoes protection of Rule 404(b)); Anthony M. Dillof, Un-
raveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 840-41 (2004)
("[E]vidence such as past or subsequent criminal acts could support a finding of predispo-
sition even in cases of high inducement."). Thus, the subjective theory of entrapment
affords very little protection to defendants with criminal history.
60 See Dillof, supra note 59, at 841.
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tualized as a limit on government conduct rather than an excuse for
defendants' misconduct, entrapment law could stop abusive law en-
forcement tactics without necessitating a difficult inquiry into defend-
ants' intent.61
Entrapment law needs a complement in the ethical rules for law-
yers. Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct should im-
pose upon prosecutors a duty to refrain from charging cases that rest
on evidence gained by entrapment.62 Moreover, when prosecutors
and law enforcement agents proactively work side by side, Rule 3.8
should require that prosecutors train officers concerning rules regu-
lating entrapment. Ethical rules governing prosecutors in their inves-
tigative capacity can have a meaningful effect on the police officers
with whom the prosecutors are working. 63
As a second means for preventing manipulative conversational
tactics, states should pass laws requiring videotaping in undercover in-
vestigations and interviews of suspects whenever practicable. This
practice would diminish the importance of officers' use of conversa-
tional strategies and officers' characterizations of these conversations
in court. Juries and judges could observe both the demeanor of the
participants in the conversations and gestures that might convey
meaning beyond the spoken words. Advances in technology allow po-
lice to install pinhole-sized cameras in purses and clothing, and vide-
otaping interviews in a police station presents little technical difficulty.
As such, if video evidence were available to a court in lieu of audio
evidence, not only might the video relieve doubts about the voluntary
nature of statements by suspects and witnesses, 64 but it could also lay
61 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-45 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguing that an "objective" approach to entrapment, focusing on the nature of the in-
ducement, is preferable to a "subjective" approach, focusing on the defendant's predisposi-
tion, because the objective approach is more likely to deter police misconduct).
62 As currently written, Rule 3.8 imposes six duties on prosecutors: (a) to refrain from
prosecuting charges not supported by probable cause, (b) to make "reasonable efforts" to
ensure that the accused is advised of the right to counsel, (c) not to seek to obtain waivers
of "important pretrial rights" by unrepresented defendants, (d) to disclose all exculpatory
material, (e) not to subpoena lawyers to appear before the grand jury except in limited
circumstances, and (f) to use caution in making public statements about pending matters.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2006).
63 For example, when the Oregon Supreme Court interpreted the state's bar code to
prohibit lawyers from directing deceptive undercover investigations, this preclusion af-
fected not only prosecutors but also law enforcement agents who depended on the author-
ization of prosecutors to proceed with their investigations. See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976
(Or. 2000) (en banc); Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltra-
tion of Religious Groups, 89 IowA L. REV. 1201, 1273-74 (2004) (observing that the Gatti rule
had significantly affected police as well as prosecutors).
64 The videotapes could show if the government agent used overbearing nonverbal
cues, if the agent moved away from the suspect at crucial moments in order to prevent the
microphone from picking up the conversation, if the suspect was in earshot when the
agent explained the criminal proposition, and so on.
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the groundwork for hearsay exceptions such as the "excited utter-
ance" exception. 65 Indeed, agents might be deterred from miscon-
duct in the first place if they know their conversations will be
videotaped. 66
Third, the courts should strengthen their enforcement of Brady v.
Maryland37 and its progeny-cases that require the government to dis-
close all exculpatory evidence to the defense. Courts have expanded
the scope of the Brady obligation over the last three decades.68 The
next step is to infer that law enforcement officials have a duty under
Brady to record all portions of conversations under surveillance, not
just those portions that appear to favor the prosecution. Selective re-
cording of conversations could deny the defense access to crucial ex-
culpatory evidence. In addition, random audits of police
investigations might improve compliance with Brady requirements.
Fourth, courts and legislatures should fortify the right of the ac-
cused to confront speakers who take part in recorded conversations.
At present, certain circumstances excuse the government from pro-
ducing informants who have spoken in tape recordings of controlled
transactions. For example, if the government offers the target's state-
ments as admissions by a party opponent 69 and then characterizes the
informant's statements as nonhearsay offered to show the effect on
the listener (e.g., to show which propositions posed by the informant
the target affirmed or denied in his admissions) ,70 the government
65 FED. R. EViD. 803(2). This exception allows the admission of a statement "relating
to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." Id. The videotape
could help to establish the agitated state of the hearsay declarant.
66 For further discussion of the value of videotaping police officers' interaction with
suspects and witnesses, see Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85
TEx. L. REv. 271, 324 (2006). Some law enforcement agencies seem wary of the accounta-
bility that a universal recording requirement might bAng. See Dennis Wagner, FBI's Policy
Drawing Fire, Amiz. REPuBLIc, Dec. 6, 2005, at IA, available at http://www.azcentral.com/
specials/special2l/articles/1206fbitaping.html (observing that the FBI's current policy al-
lows recording of interrogations only on a "limited, highly selective basis" (quotation
omitted)).
67 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (interpreting the Due Process Clause to require that the
prosecution disclose any evidence in its possession that could exculpate the accused).
68 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding the prosecution ac-
countable for all Brady material in the possession of law enforcement officials); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1985) (requiring the government to disclose evi-
dence of charging or sentencing concessions to government witnesses if the evidence mate-
rially affected the outcome); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972)
(extending the Brady rule to evidence that could be used to impeach government
witnesses).
69 Admissions by a party opponent are not hearsay pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801 (d) (2) and its state counterparts.
70 The definition of hearsay excludes a statement offered for a purpose other than to
establish the truth of the matter asserted therein. See FED. R. EvD. 801 (c) (defining hear-
say as an out-of-court statement "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
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could evade its obligation to produce the informant for cross-exami-
nation. Alternately, if the informant did not turn state's evidence un-
til after the recorded conversation, his involvement in the
conversation may amount to a co-conspirator statement, which is not
subject to the Confrontation Clause.7 ' These loopholes in confronta-
tion law are unfortunate given the urgent need to resolve ambiguities
in recorded conversations. A better approach would be to require,
perhaps by statute, that the government produce for cross-examina-
tion any speaker who took part in a recorded conversation, unless the
government can show that such a speaker is unavailable. 72
CONCLUSION
The purpose of language is to communicate the speaker's intent,
but language cannot serve this purpose when the listener manipulates
the message. Professor Shuy has helped to show the pernicious effect
of conversational strategies that police use in undercover investiga-
tions. These strategies can create the appearance of a target's guilt
when in fact the target lacks the requisite criminal intent to be guilty
of a crime.
Professor Shuy is correct that expert linguists could help to ex-
pose such conversational strategies, but other reforms could prove
serted"). Arguably, then, a proponent who introduces an out-of-court statement to show
its effect on the listener or reader is using the statement for a purpose other than to prove
the statement's assertive aspect. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 48, at 126 (stating
that the definition of hearsay excludes any statement offered for its effect on the listener or
reader). Courts generally agree that no confrontation right attaches to statements that are
not offered for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) ("The
[Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted."); United States v. Paulino, 445
F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 446 (2006); United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d
190, 209 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d 1043, 1050-51 (7th Cir. 2004),
rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 12 (2005).
71 Statements by a co-conspirator of the party opponent are admissible as nonhearsay,
provided that the declarant was seeking to further the conspiracy at the time he made the
statement. SeeFED. R. EViD. 801 (d) (2) (E). As nonhearsay, these statements are not subject
to the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1347-48
(1 th Cir.) (holding that co-conspirator recorded conversations were not testimonial evi-
dence and therefore not subject to the Confrontation Clause), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 225
(2006); United States v. Bridgeforth, 441 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2006) ("If a statement is
admissible under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), the defendant's right of confrontation is not vio-
lated."); United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 203
(2006); United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2005).
72 A few states presently require the government to prove the unavailability of the
hearsay declarant before the government can offer hearsay against the accused. State v.
McGriff, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (Haw. 1994); State v. Lopez, 926 P.2d 784, 789 (N.M. Ct. App.
1996); State v. Moore, 49 P.3d 785, 792 (Or. 2002); see also State v. Branch, 865 A.2d 673,
692-93 (N.J. 2005) (declining to require the declarant's testimony or unavailability as a
condition of admissibility, but stating that "the issue deserves careful study," and submit-
ting the matter to the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence "to consider
whether a rule change would be advisable").
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helpful as well. Indeed, some other reforms might be preferable to
enlisting the aid of experts. This Book Review has advocated a more
rigorous entrapment doctrine, wider use of video cameras, expansion
of prosecutors' Brady obligations, and fortification of confrontation
rights. These reforms would help to ensure that the intent of the ac-
cused, not the gamesmanship of the police, is the key variable that
determines the outcome of a criminal prosecution.
UNDERCOVER OPERATIVES AND RECORDED
CONVERSATIONS: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS SHUY AND LININGER
Steven D. Clymert
INTRODUCTION
In Creating Language Crimes: How Law Enforcement Uses (and Mis-
uses) Language,' Professor Roger W. Shuy contends that audio record-
ings of suspects made by undercover operatives, a staple of modern
criminal investigations and prosecutions, are potentially misleading.
He warns that the unchecked use of such recordings at trial can result
in conviction of the innocent. In a review of that book, Professor Tom
Lininger focuses on and criticizes one feature of Professor Shuy's
treatment of that danger: his advocacy of expert linguistics testimony
to alert juries that undercover recordings may be falsely suggestive of
guilt.2 Professor Lininger's review begins by describing the "near rev-
erence" that jurors have developed for expert forensic testimony in
criminal cases. 3 He is troubled by Professor Shuy's proposed intro-
duction into criminal trials of "a new category of forensic expertise,"
one that presumably will become yet another object of juror venera-
tion.4 Professor Lininger questions whether jurors need such testi-
mony and fears that it may "obfuscate as well as elucidate,"5 "usurp the
jury's fact-finding role,"6 and "invite [ ] jurors to disengage their com-
mon sense."
7
Reverence also came to my mind as I read Professor Shuy's book,
but reverence of a different sort-namely, that which prosecutors
have for both undercover law enforcement agents and surreptitious
recordings of criminal suspects. This particular reverence flows from
the quandary that informants present for prosecutors. Undercover in-
formants, those willing to pose as co-schemers, accomplices, or confi-
dants of criminal suspects, are the lifeblood of innumerable
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
I ROGER W. SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES: How LAw ENFORCEMENT USES (AND
MISUSES) LANGUAGE (2005).
2 Tom Lininger, The Promise and Shortcomings of Forensic Linguistics, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 833, 833-34, 839-40 (2007).
3 Id. at 833.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 834.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 839.
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investigations and prosecutions. They offer police and prosecutors
the prospect of gaining admissible, incriminating, and extremely per-
suasive evidence: damning statements that suspects make to those
whom they mistakenly trust. At the same time, however, informants
are notoriously unreliable, and their use threatens the moral legiti-
macy of law enforcement. At best, undercover informants are willing
to betray factually guilty friends, co-workers, and associates for per-
sonal gain. At worst, they are willing to do so to those whom they
know to be innocent. Prosecutors should never forget that some in-
formants will entrap the innocent, manufacture evidence, lie, commit
perjury, and manipulate law enforcement officials, judges, and ju-
rors. 8 Informants thus pose a formidable challenge. They are neces-
sary but can never be fully trusted. 9
Law enforcement officials navigate the horns of this dilemma
daily. They strive to obtain real-time incriminating statements from
unwitting suspects without having to rely completely on questionable
information or testimony from informants whom juries may reasona-
bly view as dishonest, unreliable, or repugnant. A first possible solu-
tion is to introduce an undercover law enforcement officer into the
relationship with the suspect. This provides a more credible witness
to the suspect's statements-one who is not being paid a bounty or
trying to avoid or mitigate punishment. A second and even more at-
tractive solution, often undertaken in conjunction with the first, is to
secretly record conversations with the suspect. Whether operated by
an undercover law enforcement official or an informant, a recording
device removes doubt about what the suspect really said and places
the jury's focus at trial squarely on the suspect's own words and deeds
rather than on an informant's reliability. One need no longer rely, or
ask a jury to rely, on an informant's testimony. It is no wonder that
law enforcement officials revere the use of undercover agents and re-
cording devices: They solve the informant quandary.
Or so one might have thought. In Creating Language Crimes, Pro-
fessor Shuy argues that such reverence is misguided. 10 Drawing from
a sample of cases involving undercover recordings, some made by in-
formants and some by undercover agents, Professor Shuy contends
8 A particularly egregious example is Leslie Vernon White, a jailhouse informant
who routinely provided false testimony about "confessions" by other inmates. See Robert
Reinhold, California Shaken over an Informer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1989, at Al ("'[Infor-
mants] are scum, the underbelly of the system. Informants will not testify because they are
nice guys. They are not out to improve the world.'" (quoting Curt Livesay, a high-level
official in the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office)).
9 For a discussion of the dangers of informant testimony, see Hon. Stephen S. Trott,
Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as Witnesses, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1381 (1996).
10 See SHU, supra note 1, at 9 ("[T] he appearance of a crime can be created in under-
cover sting operations .. ").
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that undercover operatives, with an eye (and an ear) toward future
court proceedings, can employ a host of "conversational strategies" to
manipulate recorded conversations with unwitting suspects to create
an "illusion" of guilt, thereby deceiving prosecutors, judges, and ju-
ries.11 These "strategies"-more aptly described as "tactics"-include
using ambiguous language;1 2 preventing the recording of the sus-
pect's exculpatory words, either by talking over the suspect, creating
static on the tape, putting words in the suspect's mouth, or selectively
shutting off the recorder;1 3 making passing references that appear in-
criminating without giving the suspect a chance to question or deny
them ("the hit and run strategy");1 4 concealing incriminating or other
crucial information from the suspect;1 5 and inaccurately paraphrasing
what the suspect has said to make it appear incriminating.' 6 Accord-
ing to Professor Shuy, both the planned and the unintentional use of
these tactics can and does create an illusion of criminality. 17 He sug-
gests that expert linguistics testimony can bring this potential for de-
ception to the attention of juries.' 8
In this brief Response to Professor Shuy's book and Professor Lin-
inger's review of it, I address three topics. First, I consider whether
there is reason to fear that the danger that Professor Shuy identifies is
pervasive. To assess proposed responses to the threat posed by decep-
tive conversational tactics-responses that may impose their own
costs-it is worth asking whether Professor Shuy has demonstrated
that there is a significant problem afoot.
Second, I offer some tentative thoughts about the four reforms
that Professor Lininger advances, reforms that he sees as better re-
sponses to the danger of misleading audio recordings than expert lin-
guistics testimony. Professor Lininger advocates: (a) replacing the
prevailing approach to entrapment with an objective defense, one
that focuses on whether the government induced the defendant to
engage in criminal conduct rather than the defendant's predisposi-
tion towards such conduct; (b) enacting laws that mandate the vide-
otaping of undercover operations whenever practicable; (c)
interpreting the Constitution to impose a requirement that law en-
forcement officials capture entire conversations when making under-
cover recordings; and (d) creating a constitutional or statutory
II Id. at 14.
12 See id. at 15-16.
13 See id. at 16-20.
14 See id. at 44-49.
15 See id. at 24-25.
16 See id. at 26-27.
17 See id. at 14.
18 See id. at 176-77 (explaining that linguistic analysis can aid jury understanding as
well as assist defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement officials).
2007] 849
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
obligation that the prosecution call as witnesses all participants in re-
corded conversations who are available to testify. Although space limi-
tations do not permit a full analysis of these proposals, I contend that
all four are problematic. Nonetheless, the proposals that Professor
Lininger offers share an attractive feature. They attempt to do more
than uncover during trial the use of misleading conversational tactics
by undercover operatives. Rather, they seek to minimize the use of
such tactics in the first instance, thereby preventing the indictment
and prosecution of those who would otherwise fall victim to them.
Third, I return to Professor Shuy's book and offer some general
comments. Unlike Professor Lininger, I am not troubled by the ad-
mission of expert linguistics testimony in appropriate cases. In any
event, I do not read Professor Shuy's book as a call for the extensive
use of expert linguistic testimony. Rather, I see it as a warning that
undercover recordings are not a certain solution to the informant
quandary. The cases described in the Shuy book are cautionary tales
for law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and defense attorneys-les-
sons that demonstrate that those who show too much reverence for
recorded conversations invite disaster. Although I doubt that the use
of misleading conversational tactics is as prevalent as Professor Shuy
may lead readers to believe, his book is nonetheless a valuable contri-
bution-not because it supports the adoption of a new rule, statute,
or judicial fix, but because it reminds us that no evidence is foolproof.
I
How PERVASIVE IS THE USE OF MISLEADING
CONVERSATIONAL TACTIcs?
At the outset, it is worth considering whether the problem that
Professor Shuy's book identifies occurs routinely. Professor Shuy him-
self is equivocal about the frequency with which undercover opera-
tives use misleading conversational tactics. Initially, he states, "I make
no claim that all, or even many, undercover operations carried out by
law enforcement agencies regularly engage in the practice of creating
false illusions about their targets' guilt."19 He later notes, "I want to
be very clear that I am not saying that all undercover operatives ...
use ... conversational strategies unfairly."20 Elsewhere, however, Pro-
fessor Shuy contends that on "many" of the thousands of tape record-
ings in the hundreds of criminal cases that he has examined, "the
alleged crime was cleverly created by the person wearing the mike"
and that "[i] n their effort to capture crime on tape, people wearing
the mike often employ certain conversational strategies .. "21
19 Id. at x.
20 Id. at 29.
21 Id. at 14.
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Professor Lininger also seems ambivalent on the prevalence of
the problem. He initially praises Professor Shuy's book "for drawing
attention to the conversational strategies through which law enforce-
ment officers create the appearance of a suspect's guilt,"2 2 but he later
complains that the book "marshals evidence selectively" 23 and "omits
the mundane stories of straightforward controlled transactions in
which targets plainly reveal their criminal intent."24 In the end, how-
ever, Professor Lininger does not "challenge the validity of Professor
Shuy's general thesis."25
To the extent that Professor Shuy's thesis is that a significant
number of undercover investigations result in the creation of "the illu-
sion of a crime when one was not otherwise happening,"26 there is
reason to question it. Professor Shuy's book presents a compelling
case that undercover recordings can be and perhaps occasionally are
manipulated but not that such manipulation is a recurring problem
that merits fundamental changes in doctrine or evidentiary rulings.
Professor Shuy's concern seems to apply only with respect to what
he calls "language crimes," those offenses for which a suspect's guilt is
established wholly or largely by what he says rather than what he
does.27 It is in these cases that ambiguity and other misleading tactics
can have pernicious consequences. If, at the end of the day, a predis-
posed suspect delivers ten kilograms of heroin to an undercover
agent, there is little reason to be concerned that the two used opaque
language when arranging the transaction. It is unlikely that ambiguity
in such a situation will result in an erroneous conviction. Thus,
whatever threat conversational tactics pose, this threat is absent in
many-and likely most-cases involving undercover recordings.
Further, in the subset of cases in which guilt does turn largely on
what a suspect says, law enforcement officials have a powerful incen-
tive to avoid the very tactics that Professor Shuy accuses them of using.
To be sure, Professor Shuy's book maintains that the use of these
problematic practices sometimes may be inadvertent, but his choice of
words suggests that he really thinks otherwise. His chosen terminol-
ogy-"creating language crimes" 28 and "conversational strategies" 29-
22 Lininger, supra note 2, at 834.
23 Id. at 840.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 841.
26 SHUY, supra note 1, at 15.
27 Professor Shuy defines a language crime as a "crime that is accomplished through
language alone." Id. at 6.
28 Id. at 3-12.
29 Id. at 13-29.
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implies that those involved set out to use manipulative tactics to create
a misleading appearance of guilt.30
One of the principal aims of undercover operations is to record
suspects making, adopting, or acknowledging unambiguously incrimi-
nating statements. Such clarity is an important investigative objective
because, if obtained, it will leave the suspect with little room to ma-
neuver and usually will result in a guilty plea or a conviction after trial.
The use of ambiguous language, concealment, interruptions, and the
like, all of which Professor Shuy attributes to undercover operatives,
undermine, rather than further, that fundamental objective.
If this objective is so important, Professor Shuy might respond,
why are undercover tape recordings so often replete with ambiguous
conversations rather than clearly inculpatory statements? There may
be several explanations. When parties to a conversation have a shared
knowledge of the topic about which they are communicating, there is
little need to be explicit about it. When that topic involves illegal and
morally reprehensible conduct, a fear of hidden recording devices
may inhibit the parties from discussing it openly. One need only read
or listen to transcripts of conversations recorded using wiretaps and
room bugs-conversations that typically do not involve undercover
operatives, and thus are, by definition, free from manipulative conver-
sational tactics-to realize that it is common for criminals to discuss
their trade ambiguously or in code.31 An undercover operative who
attempts to discuss criminal conduct with a suspect openly, using clear
and unambiguous language, threatens the investigation's viability.
Seen in this light, the use of ambiguous language is less a clever tactic
than a reality of undercover work.
There may be informants or undercover police officers who,
when all else fails, resort to misleading and manipulative conversa-
tional tactics to ensnare a possibly innocent suspect. But Professor
Shuy's book does not make the case that the use of such tactics is
routine. Professor Shuy describes approximately a dozen cases in
which he concludes that such conduct took place. 32 Even these exam-
30 Professor Shuy contends that "there is a better than average chance that the choice
of discourse strategies by the person wearing the mike is very conscious. . .. " Id. at 13. He
explains that in his experience, it was often the case that "the alleged crime was cleverly
created by the person wearing the mike." Id. at 14.
31 See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (recognizing that inter-
cepted conversations may be "ambiguous in nature or . . . involve [ ] guarded or coded
language"). Indeed, the federal wiretap statute permits an exception to the general duty
to contemporaneously "minimize" the interception of communications for coded conver-
sations, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000) (permitting postinterception minimization), reflect-
ing Congress's awareness that such communications are commonly in code.
32 In Chapters Four through Ten of the book, Professor Shuy describes what he per-
ceives to be the use of misleading conversational tactics by cooperating witnesses during
undercover operations. In Chapters Eleven, Twelve, and Fourteen, Professor Shuy de-
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pies present a murky picture, however. For each case, Professor Shuy
provides the reader with a description of the pertinent facts, portions
of transcripts of recordings that he has selected, and his perspective,
which was formed as a defense-retained expert witness.33 Criminal
cases are complex, however, and without a fuller account of each case,
it is hard to reach an informed opinion about whether manipulative
conversational tactics were truly at work. Had the prosecution re-
tained a linguistics expert for these cases, that expert likely would
have drawn conclusions different from Professor Shuy's, at least in
some instances.
The point here is not that Professor Shuy's presentation of the
cases is unfairly one-sided or abbreviated. Rather, it is that although
Professor Shuy makes a good case that recorded conversations can be
manipulated to create an illusion of guilt, it is less clear that under-
cover operatives did so in every case described in his book. More to
the point, Professor Shuy's book does not prove, and indeed does not
attempt to prove, that these practices occur with any regularity in un-
dercover operations. Later in this Response, I will examine the rele-
vance of this point to the merits of Professor Shuy's book.
II
ASSESSING PROFESSOR LININGER'S PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Because, as noted above, Professor Lininger seems both ambiva-
lent about the gravity of the problem of conversational tactics and op-
posed to the increased use of expert testimony as a response, it is
surprising that his alternative proposals, sweeping doctrinal changes
in the form of revised constitutional doctrine and new statutes, are so
dramatic. By itself, the limited anecdotal evidence that Professor Shuy
provides hardly merits reform on the order that Professor Lininger
recommends. Further, as explained below, there is reason to question
whether all of Professor Lininger's proposed reforms are truly respon-
sive to the concerns that Professor Shuy's book identifies.
In fairness to Professor Lininger, he apparently intends his pro-
posals to "check inappropriate police conduct" beyond the misuse of
conversational tactics.3 4 In the limited space available to him, Profes-
sor Lininger offers reasons for his proposals in addition to their
claimed efficacy in addressing the misuse of conversational tactics.
scribes what he believes to be similar conduct by undercover law enforcement officials.
Chapters Thirteen and Fifteen do not involve recorded conversations by undercover oper-
atives: Chapter Thirteen describes witness interviews in a criminal investigation, and Chap-
ter Fifteen discusses an interrogation of a crime suspect.
33 See SHuy, supra note 1, at 179-82, for a description of Professor Shuy's experience
as an expert witness.
34 Lininger, supra note 2, at 841.
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Even so, whether meant only to address Professor Shuy's concerns or
also as an effort to remedy other defects in the criminal justice system,
there are reasons to be cautious about Professor Lininger's proposed
reforms.
A. An Objective Entrapment Defense
Professor Lininger first proposes a "revitaliz[ation]" of entrap-
ment law to address the misuse of conversational tactics.35 In federal
court, a defendant who presents some evidence of entrapment is enti-
tled to a jury instruction requiring acquittal unless the prosecution
can prove one or both of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
that the government did not induce the defendant to commit the of-
fense ("inducement"); or that the defendant was predisposed to com-
mit the offense ("predisposition") .36 Because the government
arguably induces criminal conduct during many undercover opera-
tions, 37 the prosecution often responds to entrapment claims by prov-
ing that the defendant was predisposed to commit the charged
offense. 38 The government commonly does so by presenting evidence
that the defendant has been convicted for similar offenses in the
past.39 Although such evidence legitimately undercuts the defense by
establishing predisposition, it also can unfairly prejudice the defen-
dant by prompting a jury to convict because of general concerns
about dangerousness rather than a determination that the defendant
committed the charged crime.
35 Id. at 842. ("[C]ourts and legislatures should revitalize entrapment law.").
36 See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (noting that "a valid entrap-
ment defense has two related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack
of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct," and
that a defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction if "there exists evidence sufficient
for a reasonable jury to find in his favor" regarding the defense); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMI-
NALJURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 9.01 (2000) ("The
government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
not entrapped."). For a general discussion of entrapment law in federal courts, see Fred
Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and
Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 829 (1992).
37 Cf Bennett, supra note 36, at 831 ("Because of the difficulties inherent in detecting
and successfully prosecuting consensual crimes, federal and state law enforcement agen-
cies often use undercover agents and informants in their efforts to expose the offenses. A
common method employed is the solicitation of the offense by an informant or an under-
cover law enforcement official.").
38 See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) ("[T]he entrapment de-
fense 'focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime,'
rather than upon the conduct of the Government's agents." (quoting United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973))).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Van Horn, 277 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that "in
situations where the defendant employs entrapment as a defense to criminal liability, prior
bad acts relevant to a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime are highly probative
and can overcome the [Federal Rules of Evidence] Rule 404(b) bar" on the use of other
bad acts or crimes to show propensity).
[Vol. 92:847
UNDERCOVER OPERATIVES
Professor Lininger proposes jettisoning the predisposition prong
in cases in which "the government has used improper inducements to
involve the defendant in criminal activity."40 Thus, he urges recogni-
tion of an entrapment defense even in (at least some) cases when the
person whom the government induced already was predisposed to
commit the crime. According to Professor Lininger, this not only
would address Professor Shuy's concern by "rein ling] in manipulation
of language";41 it also could "better protect suspects who have prior
convictions" 42 and "stop abusive law enforcement tactics."43
I question whether this reform would yield the first of those bene-
fits. Professor Lininger's contention that this reform responds to Pro-
fessor Shuy's concern is based on the faulty premise that "the conduct
of which Professor Shuy complains"-the manipulative creation of
language crimes-"is, in many cases, entrapment."44 In fact, the two
concerns are distinct. Professor Shuy's book focuses on the danger
that the use of conversational tactics during recorded conversations
will deceive prosecutors and juries, causing them to wrongly believe
that a suspect has incriminated himself. Professor Shuy is concerned
that suspects who have not committed crimes will find themselves ac-
cused, tried, and convicted because undercover operatives have cre-
ated an illusion of guilt.4 5
In contrast, entrapment doctrine focuses on the danger that gov-
ernment inducement will persuade unwilling suspects to actually com-
mit crimes. By definition, an entrapped suspect has engaged in
conduct that would be criminal but for the government inducement
and the suspect's lack of predisposition. 46 Changes to entrapment
doctrine may protect those whom the government induces to commit
crimes but will not provide relief to those who have not committed
crimes yet nonetheless appear guilty as a result of an undercover oper-
ative's manipulation of a recorded conversation.
Whether the proposed modification of entrapment doctrine
speaks to Professor Shuy's concerns, it presents problems. 47 Even if
40 Lininger, supra note 2, at 842.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 843.
44 Id. at 842.
45 See SHUY, supra note 1, at 14.
46 See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992) (noting that "the
defense of entrapment is at issue" in cases "[w] here the Government has induced an indi-
vidual to break the law").
47 Professor Lininger's proposed modification to entrapment law is part of an ongo-
ing debate between those who favor an "objective" approach to entrapment, meaning one
that turns on the propriety of the government's conduct, and proponents of the prevailing
"subjective" approach, which permits such inquiry but typically focuses on whether the
defendant was predisposed to commit the offense. For a discussion of the subjective and
objective theories of entrapment, see Bennett, supra note 36, at 864-67; Anthony M. Dillof,
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Professor Lininger is correct about some of the claimed benefits,
there are compelling reasons why those who are predisposed to break
the law and do so should not have the benefit of an affirmative de-
fense merely because government agents have encouraged their crimi-
nal conduct. Predisposed lawbreakers are both morally culpable and
socially dangerous regardless of whether it is the government or a pri-
vate actor who persuades them to commit a crime. Given an opportu-
nity to break the law, they have chosen to do so and presumably will
again. Fashioning a rule that gives them a windfall would be a costly
means of addressing concerns about aggressive government investiga-
tive tactics, particularly without compelling evidence that abuses are
widespread.
Another troubling feature of Professor Lininger's proposal,
which would hinge an entrapment defense on a determination that a
government investigation improperly induced the commission of a
crime, is that it would vest federal jurors, who lack the knowledge and
expertise to properly assess the propriety of various undercover inves-
tigative tactics, with responsibility for making ad hoc determinations
about whether law enforcement practices are "outrageous" or "abu-
sive." An entrapment defense that places primary reliance on such
vague and subjective standards will result in inconsistent verdicts,
thereby confronting law enforcement officials with contradictory
guidance.
Further, adopting a rule that effectively prohibits the government
from inducing willing suspects to commit crimes would greatly impair,
if not foreclose, many undercover investigations. The line between
passive undercover investigation and inducement is not a clear one,48
and a rule creating an affirmative defense whenever there is govern-
ment inducement could chill undercover operations. As Judge
Learned Hand observed, providing a predisposed defendant with an
entrapment defense based solely on government inducement would
make it "impossible ever to secure convictions of any offences which
consist of transactions that are carried on in secret."49
Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 889-95 (2004). Accord-
ing to Bennett, "no current Justice on the Supreme Court seems remotely interested in
adopting the objective approach to entrapment, and defense attorneys with even a modi-
cum of common sense are perfectly content with the present situation." Bennett, supra
note 36, at 867.
48 The standard used to determine whether the government has induced a defendant
to commit a crime-sometimes phrased as whether there is "government conduct which
creates a substantial risk that an undisposed person or otherwise law-abiding citizen would
commit the offense," United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986)-is sus-
ceptible to inconsistent application.
49 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (explaining why no
entrapment defense is available to a defendant who "was ready and willing to commit the
offence charged, whenever the opportunity offered [sic]").
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Although Professor Lininger takes issue with "Professor Shuy's
general distrust of proactive investigative strategies"50 and "preference
for passive listening by undercover officers," 51 and believes that of-
ficers should be permitted to "contrive circumstances that squarely
present suspects with opportunities to commit crimes,' 52 his proposed
reform would make such proactive undercover operations more sus-
ceptible to entrapment challenges by criminal defendants and thus
less attractive to law enforcement. At a time when pedophiles roam
the Internet and laws designed to protect children from exploitation
are enforced largely by undercover agents posing as victims, 53 a rule
forcing the government to refrain from inducing even predisposed
suspects to violate the law would come at a high cost.
B. Required Videotaping
Professor Lininger also proposes legislation requiring that under-
cover encounters be videotaped unless it is impracticable to do so.54
This proposal has three attractive features. First, it responds directly
to some of the troubling tactics that Professor Shuy identifies, such as
an undercover operative recording incriminating conversations that,
unbeknownst to a subsequent listener, occur outside the presence of
the suspect.55 Second, it would deter such misleading practices and
bring their use to the prosecutor's attention before a defendant's in-
dictment.56 Third, it would provide juries with reliable visual evidence
of undercover operations.
However, it is one thing to promote the use of technology that cap-
tures sight as well as sound and quite another to require it. Although
he does not say so, by proposing the latter, Professor Lininger may
well mean that a failure to comply with the proposed videotaping re-
quirement would result in exclusion of other evidence of undercover
conversations including, for example, audio recordings. 57 If so, this
proposed reform is problematic.
50 Lininger, supra note 2, at 841.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Donald S. Yamagami, Comment, Prosecuting Cyber-pedophiles: How Can Intent Be
Shown in a Virtual World in Light of the Fantasy Defense, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 547, 551
(2001) (explaining that most FBI cases against pedophiles who arrange to meet children
through internet conversations are investigated by an "FBI agent [who] poses as a female
minor in chat rooms known to attract pedophiles").
54 See Lininger, supra note 2, at 843.
55 See SHuv, supra note 1, at 24-25.
56 See Lininger, supra note 2, at 844 ("[A]gents might be deterred from misconduct in
the first place if they know their conversations will be videotaped.").
57 Professor Lininger does not suggest any other sanction or remedy for a violation of
his proposed rule requiring that police videotape undercover operations. In another con-
text, Professor Lininger proposes protocols for police use of videotape recorders. See Tom
Uninger, Reconceptualizing Confrontation After Davis, 85 TEX. L. REv. 271, 324 (2006) (rec-
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If the suppression of evidence of incriminating conversations may
result from a failure to videotape when practicable, there will be hotly
contested suppression hearings concerning practicability whenever
police fail to produce a video recording that clearly depicts an en-
counter between an undercover operative and the defendant. Be-
cause of a host of practical impediments to obtaining clear video
recordings, such hearings will likely occur with some frequency. Al-
though "[a] dvances in technology allow police to install pinhole-sized
cameras in purses and clothing,"58 not all police departments have
sufficient resources to maintain and use such cutting-edge technology,
or even the capability to videotape undercover operations effectively
on a routine basis, using any kind of technology. The proposed re-
form will confront courts with questions of police-department budget
choices, claimed technological glitches, equipment failure, insuffi-
cient recording tape, poor lighting conditions, misdirected camera
angles, and out-of-focus lenses. Even if video recording is desirable, it
is hard to make the case that a criminal defendant should be entitled
to suppress evidence because a police officer neglected to charge a
battery on a video recorder before a critical undercover meeting or
because an undercover operative mistakenly pointed a purse contain-
ing a pinhole camera in the wrong direction.
Further, the proposed requirement would threaten to exclude re-
liable audio recordings of undercover operations, as well as testimony
from credible participants in those operations, all on the mere chance
that an undercover operative may have manipulated the recording or
the conversation. It would be an odd rule that required the suppres-
sion of such evidence and testimony merely because of a failure to use
videotaping technology to obtain the same evidence in a marginally
more reliable format.
C. A Constitutional Obligation to Record Entire Conversations
Professor Lininger also proposes that courts reinterpret the Su-
preme Court's landmark decision in Brady v. Maryland,59 which re-
quires that the prosecution disclose to the defense in criminal cases
evidence in its possession that is both exculpatory (or mitigating) and
material, to impose on law enforcement officials a duty to "record all
portions of conversations under surveillance, not just those portions
ommending protocol for police video recording during responses to reports of domestic
violence). In contrast, in his response to Professor Shuy, Professor Lininger argues that
"states should pass laws requiring videotaping in undercover investigations." Lininger,
supra note 2, at 843. Presumably, violation of police protocols would not result in suppres-
sion of evidence. It is unclear whether the same is true for the statutory reform under
consideration here.
58 Lininger, supra note 2, at 843.
59 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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that appear to favor the prosecution." 60 This reform also directly ad-
dresses one of the conversational tactics that Professor Shuy identi-
fies-namely, the deceptive practice of shutting off a recording device
to avoid capturing exculpatory portions of a conversation with the
suspect.61
Despite what Professor Lininger describes as an expansion of the
Brady rule over the past three decades, 62 there is nothing in the Su-
preme Court's decisions to suggest that the Court will interpret Brady
and its progeny in a manner consistent with his proposal. The Brady
doctrine imposes on the prosecution only an obligation to produce to
the defense exculpatory evidence that already is in the government's
possession, 63 not a duty to collect evidence. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has refused to impose more than minimal constitutional restric-
tions on the government's destruction of already-collected evidence,
even if it may be exculpatory. 64 This makes clear that the Court will
not recognize a constitutional obligation to record all portions of con-
versations, especially on the speculative showing that Professor Lin-
inger's article describes: that a failure to record an entire conversation
"could deny the defense access to crucial exculpatory evidence. 6 5
As a policy matter, it may be desirable to promote full recording,
but a legal requirement, like the proposal for legally mandated vide-
otaping, is problematic, particularly if the remedy is exclusion of those
portions of the conversation that were recorded. In cases in which it
is shown that an undercover operative chose to record only a portion
60 Lininger, supra note 2, at 844.
61 See SHuy, supra note 1, at 20-21. As is true for other manipulative conversational
tactics that Professor Shuy identifies, there is only thin anecdotal evidence suggesting that
law enforcement officers engage in such selective recording.
62 See Lininger, supra note 2, at 844. Although Professor Lininger correctly notes that
some of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting Brady have enhanced the protection
that it affords criminal defendants, see, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1972) (holding that the Brady disclosure obligation applies to impeachment evidence),
cited in Lininger, supra note 2, at 844 n.68; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-38 (1995)
(holding that the cumulative effect of undisclosed exculpatory evidence must be consid-
ered when assessing materiality, even if the prosecution was unaware of some such evi-
dence), cited in Lininger, supra note 2, at 844 n.68, the Court also has limited the Brady
doctrine, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1985) (holding that the Brady
disclosure obligation applies to exculpatory or impeachment evidence only if the failure to
disclose would "undermine confidence in the outcome" of the trial). But see Lininger,
supra note 2, at 844 n.68 (interpreting Bagley as expanding the scope of the Brady
obligation).
63 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (describing Brady as impos-
ing a duty on the prosecution to "turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable
to the accused and material to guilt or punishment").
64 See Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004) ("[T]he failure to preserve ...
'potentially useful evidence' does not violate due process 'unless a criminal defendant can
show bad faith on the part of the police.'" (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58
(1988) (emphasis omitted))).
65 Lininger, supra note 2, at 844 (emphasis added).
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of a conversation and there is no plausible explanation for that
choice, a more acceptable alternative would be to instruct the jury
that it may draw an inference that the unrecorded portion of the con-
versation would be harmful to the government's case. This would be
similar to the venerable "missing witness instruction," which courts
sometimes use when the government fails to produce at trial a witness
exclusively within its control who has knowledge of critical events. 66
Although the use of a "missing conversation instruction" may not be
ideal, insofar as it will be difficult for the jury to determine when to
draw an adverse inference and what to make of such an inference, it is
preferable to concealing probative evidence from the jury, namely the
portions of the conversation that were recorded, based solely on a
hunch or claim that the unrecorded portions undercut the incrimi-
nating effect of the recording. In addition, defendants already have
the ability to prove through evidence or suggest through cross-exami-
nation what was said when the recording device was turned off.
D. Expanded Confrontation Rights
Professor Lininger also proposes that either courts by interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause 67 or legislatures
by statute create a rule that obligates the government to "produce for
cross-examination any speaker who took part in a recorded conversa-
tion. '68 Presumably, such a rule would enable the defendant to cross-
examine all participants to ferret out the true nature of the defen-
dant's contributions to recorded conversations. 69 This proposal is
both ill-advised and unnecessary.
It is ill-advised because it would favor less reliable evidence over
more reliable evidence. The prosecution could escape the proposed
call-all-participants rule by proving the content of a conversation
66 See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893) ("The rule, even in crimi-
nal cases, is that, if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose
testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates the pre-
sumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable.").
67 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted
with the witnesses against him .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
68 Lininger, supra note 2, at 845. This proposal can be read in two ways. Professor
Lininger may mean that the proposed obligation to produce as witnesses at trial all partici-
pants to a recorded conversation arises only when the government seeks to introduce the
recording into evidence. Alternatively, his proposal may be read to mean that the obliga-
tion to produce all witnesses arises whenever the government records a conversation,
whether or not it later seeks to have the jury hear the recording. The former interpreta-
tion is more consistent with Professor lininger's discussion of the proposal. See id. at 844.
(discussing the use of evidentiary rules to overcome hearsay objections to recorded state-
ments offered during trial when the prosecution does not call as witnesses those who made
the statements).
69 See id. at 845. (arguing that the proposal would address "the urgent need to resolve
ambiguities in recorded conversations").
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through the testimony of a percipient witness to the conversation
(such as an undercover agent). Such testimony would be based on
the witness's imperfect and perhaps biased recollection. In the same
trial, however, the proposed reform would preclude the prosecution
from introducing the more reliable recording of the conversation un-
less it is willing to call all participants as witnesses.
The proposed rule is unnecessary because the Compulsory Pro-
cess Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the
right to subpoena and call as witnesses all available participants to any
conversation. 70 If those witnesses are hostile to the defendant, Rule
607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence empowers the defendant to
cross-examine them.
7 1
III
LINGUISTICS EXPERTS AND EARLY RECOGNITION THAT
RECORDED CONVERSATIONS CAN BE MANIPULATED
In the end, Professor Shuy's proposal for use of expert testimony
from linguists in appropriate cases is preferable to the more dramatic
doctrinal responses that Professor Lininger offers. Even if use of de-
ceptive conversational tactics is not commonplace, Professor Shuy
presents a persuasive argument that there may be some cases in which
detailed linguistic analysis can shed light on recorded conversations.
There is no reason to believe that expert testimony on this subject in
such cases has a greater tendency to confuse or mislead jurors than
similar expert testimony that routinely is admitted in criminal cases.
For example, in narcotics prosecutions, courts often permit prosecu-
70 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Supreme Court has rejected a broader version of the rule that Professor Lininger
suggests-one that would require that the government either produce out-of-court declar-
ants or demonstrate their unavailability before introducing their out-of-court statements.
Characterizing such a requirement as "an unavailability rule," the Court gave reasons for its
rejection that are applicable in this narrower context:
Nor is an unavailability rule likely to produce much testimony that adds
meaningfully to the trial's truth-determining process. Many declarants will
be subpoenaed by the prosecution or defense, regardless of any Confronta-
tion Clause requirement, while the Compulsory Process Clause and eviden-
tiary rules permitting a defendant to treat witnesses as hostile will aid
defendants in obtaining a declarant's live testimony. And while an unavail-
ability rule would therefore do little to improve the accuracy of factfinding,
it is likely to impose substantial additional burdens on the factfinding pro-
cess. The prosecution would be required to repeatedly locate and keep
continuously available each declarant, even when neither the prosecution
nor the defense has any interest in calling the witness to the stand. An
additional inquiry would be injected into the question of admissibility of
evidence, to be litigated both at trial and on appeal.
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1992) (citations and footnote omitted).
71 Rule 607 provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling the witness." FED. R. EVD. 607.
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tion-proffered expert witnesses to explain to juries the significance
and meaning of coded language in recorded conversations. 7 2 It is
hard to see why criminal defendants should not be permitted, in ap-
propriate cases, to elicit similar testimony from their own experts. If
proffered expert testimony appears to be unreliable or unhelpful to
the jury, courts have the authority to exclude it.7  And while Professor
Lininger rightly fears that wealthy defendants will enjoy greater access
to such testimony than indigents, the same can be said for access to
other expert testimony as well as litigation resources generally. The
proper response to disproportionate access to litigation resources is to
increase indigents' access, not deny them to otherwise deserving de-
fendants who can afford them.
The principal deficiency of expert testimony at trial as a response
to the threat of conversational tactics is that it offers too little, too late.
The most that it can achieve is the eventual acquittal of a wrongly
accused defendant. Professor Shuy would likely agree that such an
outcome is not a victory for the criminal justice system; it is merely a
lesser form of failure. To his credit, Professor Lininger appears to
recognize this deficiency and has proposed reforms designed to pre-
vent the execution of the tactics in the first instance.
Ultimately, however, Professor Shuy's book is not a call for expert
linguistics testimony at trial. Nor is its contribution the revelation of
an endemic problem that merits doctrinal remedies. Rather, its virtue
is that it cautions against inordinate reverence for undercover record-
ings. His book is meant to serve as a wake-up call-not only for prose-
cutors deciding whether to seek an indictment based on an apparently
incriminating recording and defense attorneys deciding whether to
recommend that a client plead guilty or go to trial, but also for law
enforcement officials deciding how to handle undercover operatives
and whether to arrest.7 4 As Professor Shuy explains, linguistics ex-
perts can help educate those actors in the criminal justice system,
preferably before indictment and trial.75 Although he also supports
72 See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[I]t is well estab-
lished that experienced government agents may testify to the meaning of coded drug lan-
guage under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702.").
73 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 empowers federal courts to exclude proffered expert
testimony if it will not "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence," if there is insuffi-
cient factual support, or if the proponent is unable to establish that "the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods" and that "the [expert] witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EvID. 702. Similarly, Rule
704(b) prohibits the admission of expert linguistics testimony "as to whether the defen-
dant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto." Id. 704(b).
74 See SHUv, supra note 1, at 183-85 (identifying "defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
law enforcement officers who plan and carry out undercover operations by tape-recording
conversations of targets," along with other forensic linguists, as his "primary audience[ ]").
75 See id. at 179-85.
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the use of expert linguistics testimony at trial, he does so only when all
else fails.7
6
CONCLUSION
Although they offer different solutions, Professors Shuy and Lin-
inger both recognize that the problematic use of manipulative conver-
sational tactics ought to be addressed, preferably before arrest,
indictment, and trial. Because there is no clear evidence that the
problem is widespread, and because the doctrinal remedies that Pro-
fessor Lininger proposes carry unacceptable costs, I favor more lim-
ited responses. Whatever the relative merits of the solutions that
Professors Shuy and Lininger propose, however, the real contribution
of Professor Shuy's book is not that he has solved a problem but
rather that he has brought one to our attention.
76 See id. at 184 ("It's always better to avoid a problem before it happens.").
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